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effectiveness? In today's Brazil a robust constitutional and legal framework 
ensures democratic civilian control over intelligence (which can be found in 
the Appendix), as exists over the armed forces, but both intelligence 
professionals and academics lament the confusing legal basis, the 
problematic institutional relations, and the lack of resources whereby 
intelligence could be made more effective. The main reason for this 
situation, as with the armed forces, is the popular perception, shared by 
the political decisionmakers, that Brazil has no enemies. During the 
military regime, 1964-1985, the decisionmakers, who were all general 
officers in the Brazilian Army, did perceive a threat, as defined in the 
country's infamous doctrine of national security. And their intelligence 
organization, the Serviqo Nacional de Informaqoes (SNI) was given 
tremendous leeway and abundant resources to deal with this perceived 
threat. Brazil's experience with the SNI and other state security 
institutions during the military regime has left a stigma for today's 
intelligence agencies; this is the second additional reason for the current 
lack of effectiveness. Brazil epitomizes a common theme in new 
democracies: the emphasis placed on achieving democratic civilian control 
over the security forces, including the armed forces and intelligence 
agencies, but an unwillingness to commit political capital and financial 
resources to make either effective in implementing their possible roles and 
missions. 
KEY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES 
According to Decree Law No 4,376 of 13 September 2002, implementing 
Law no. 9,883 of 7 December 1999, which created the Sistema Brasileiro 
de Inteligencia (SISBIN), the system is composed of thirteen 
organizations spread over ten different ministries and three separate 
elements of the Presidency. Of these the most important are: Agencia 
Brasileira de Inteligencia (ABIN), the SISBIN's central organ; the 
Coordenaqiio de Inteligencia do Departamento de Policia Federal (PF) of 
the Ministry of Justice; the Departamento de Inteligencia Estrategica 
of the Ministerio da Defesa (MOD), as well as the intelligence sectors of 
the three services and the General Staff of the Armed Forces; and, the 
Gabinete de Seguranqa Institucional of the Presidency, which, according to 
the decree law, is the "coordinating organ for federal intelligence 
activities." The ample legal basis of the intelligence system has been 
thoroughly described by Marco Cepik, and can be found in the 
Appendix. Understanding the contemporary challenges confronting the 
Brazilian intelligence system, analyzing its effectiveness, requires a look to 
the legacy of its past. 
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A REPRESSIVE HISTORY 
In 1964 Brazil's democratically-elected government was overthrown in 
a military coup, and between then and 1985 the country was governed by 
a series of five military presidents. While the level of repression was less 
than other Southern Cone dictatorships, it was still very serious, especially 
between 1968 and 1974, and the intelligence and security services were 
central to this repression. In an earlier work on the Church and politics in 
Brazil I gave much attention to the role of the Doctrine of National 
Security in legitimating, at least in their own minds, the role of the armed 
forces in extirpating the Communist and other subversive forces from 
the society. Central to this crusade was the SNI. As Alfred Stepan 
demonstrated, the SNI, created by military decree less than three months 
after the coup, was granted expansive functions and prerogatives, which 
further expanded as the dictatorship took on new battles against the 
subversives. The SNI was the military regime's main tool for control and 
repression. As Stepan stated: "General Golbery do Couto e Silva, the chief 
author of the decree and the first director of the SNI, later lamented that 
he had created a 'monster'. It is obvious, however, that regardless of its 
later expansion, the SNI was, from its inception, a powerful body.,,3 
Stepan and others have demonstrated that the SNI was subsequently 
militarized, becoming indeed the fourth military service. Stepan also 
demonstrated how the SNI expanded its functions, in the context of 
an increasingly repressive dictatorship, and came to monopolize more 
functions than any other major intelligence system in the world. Two of 
the military presidents in this period-General Garrastazu Medici and 
General Joao Figueiredo-had earlier been heads of the SNI. As if the 
SNI were not enough, the bureaucratic politics of the Brazilian 
dictatorship spawned several other intelligence organizations, resulting in 
an intelligence system that constituted a state within a state.4 This system, 
with its high degree of autonomy and extensive powers, opposed the slow 
transition from dictatorship to democracy which occurred, under military 
supervision, between 1974 and 1985. In sum, in the terms used in studies 
of state security, it was a "political police," becoming an "independent 
security state" for the period of 1968-1974.5 The legacy of this very strong, 
autonomous, and repressive intelligence apparatus is fundamental to 
understanding the reforms of the post-1985 transition. 
Also necessary is an awareness that the transition to democracy was 
initiated, and supervised, by the military regime itself. Beginning with 
President Ernesto Geisel in 1974, it was not completed, in terms of 
a civilian taking office as president, until 1985. The military successfully 
slowed the pace of change and reform, and initially retained extensive 
prerogatives. Even after 1985, for various reasons, the civilian who 
ultimately became president, Jose Sarney, 1985-1990, was a holdover from 
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the military regime itself. His complicity and the very complicated political 
environment of the late 1980s, the Constitution of 1988, the charter of the 
"New Republic," turned out to be very long and inconsistent, and without 
the political creativity of today's political elites, would be unworkable.6 
Yet, it does provide a legal basis for a democratic Brazil, one in which 
a huge emphasis is placed on legality, or at least legalism. Yet, it must be 
emphasized, the Constitution does not even mention, let alone deal 
explicitly with, intelligence. 
Due to even more bad luck, the country had no president with democratic 
legitimacy until the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994. This 
significant lag in democratically-elected civilians assuming power meant 
that fundamental reforms in the security and defense arenas, including 
intelligence, were put off. Not until 1999 was the first-ever ministry of 
defense in Brazil created, with a civilian named as minister. And, not until 
that same year were laws creating ABIN passed. Thus, at least until 
President Cardoso took office, during the early political transition and the 
first decade of the civilian governments, in the security and defense arenas 
the governments did not have the coherence (which continues to be 
difficult to achieve in the political party and federal system emerging from 
the 1988 Constitution) and legitimacy-based on free and fair elections-
to begin establishing a definitive structure in the armed forces and 
intelligence. In sum, only after 14 years subsequent to the formal transition 
to civilian government did the basic structures of the intelligence system 
begin to be established, and laws and decrees issued to implement different 
elements of the intelligence system. 
No Acknowledged Enemies 
If, during the military regime of 1964-1985, the government saw real or 
imagined enemies everywhere, and used the SNI and other security services 
to identify and repress them, the perception of the democratic governments 
since then has been totally different. A common refrain and widely 
held perception is that Brazil has no enemies. Brazil is considered 
a "geopolitically satisfied" country with no major border disputes with its 
neighbors. This is significant, considering that Brazil shares a border with 
ten countries in South America. Chile and Ecuador are the only countries 
on that continent that do not share a border with Brazil. Also significant 
is the fact that the "geopolitically frustrated" countries in South America, 
which include at least Argentina (Falklands/Malvinas), Bolivia (exit to the 
sea, or salida af mar), and Venezuela (territorial claims to the Essequibo 
River), are not "frustrated" in relation to Brazil. Thus, Brazil occupies 
a unique position in the world:f. it shares borders with many nations, but 
has no major geopolitical issues with any of them. Furthermore, Brazil's 
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rivalry with Argentina has largely dissipated. The rivalry peaked in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, as the military regimes in both countries viewed each 
other's missile and nuclear programs with profound suspicion. Competition 
also extended to riverine resources, as Brazil's bid for hydroelectric power 
along the Parana River was met with protests by the Argentine government. 
Brazil's defense posture at the time was driven in large measure by the rivalry 
with Argentina. In the final years of the military regimes, and especially 
under civilian presidents, Brazil and Argentina began to cooperate in trade 
and even in the nuclear and missile arenas, creating an almost textbook 
example of cooperation. Today, together in UNASUR, Argentina and Brazil 
enjoy mostly harmonious relations. 
The perception of Brazil having no enemies is vividly captured in an 
interview with the then-Minister of Defense, Jose Viegas Filho, in 
a newspaper of the federal capital, Brasilia, in March 2002. In response to 
a question-Is Brazil immune to terrorism?-he stated: "No one can say 
that they are immune to terrorism. But if you were to draw up a list of 
countries that are vulnerable to this problem, Brazil would certainly be in 
one of the lowest rankings. Brazil has no enemies. There is not one 
country in the world that hates us or is prejudiced against US.,,7 
Looking Inward 
The Pollyanna self-image of Brazil, without internal or external enemies and 
oriented towards domestic problems largely associated with socio-economic 
underdevelopment, has been the key theme of all governments since the 
transition to democracy in 1985. An early glimpse into this perception was 
nicely expressed in a magisterial article by Celso Lafer, a professor of Law 
at the University of Sao Paulo, and Foreign Minister during part of the 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso government. After a historical review of 
Brazil's internal development and international relations, Lafer stated that 
"in the development of national space and the alleviation of poverty, the 
real challenge for Brazil lies in the negotiations of the financial agenda and 
the agenda for international trade."s At no point in the article did Lafer 
discuss security or defense issues. His focus was exclusively on the 
development of "national space," economic development, and national 
identity. According to Lafer, the foreign policy of Brazil is characterized 
by "a concentration on the value of diplomacy and law in international 
intercourse as appropriate ways to deal with conflict, foster cooperation, 
and reduce the impetus of power politics.,,9 This special issue of Daedalus 
devoted to Brazil, contained fourteen chapters, but not a single section 
of anyone of them concerned security and defense issues or the armed forces. 
Another item from that same period demonstrating the lack of emphasis 
on national security and defense was the table of contents of the official 
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summary of the accomplishments of the presidency of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso. In Brazil 1994.2002: The Era of the Real the topic of defense, 
with six pages, is just above tourism, with four pages. The. environme~~ 
received 14 pages, foreign policy 21, and development and foreIgn trade 30. 
Since the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) has been in power, beginning in 
2002, first under President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva and now under 
President Dilma Rousseff, documenting the continuity of this benign view 
of the world becomes necessary. Current corroboration for this view is 
found in the Estrategia Nacional de Defesa (END) of 2008, which states in 
the Introduction: "Brazil is a peaceful country, by tradition and 
conviction. It lives in peace with its neighbors" II And, in the same Defense 
Strategy, under "Guidelines": "Presently, Brazil does not have any 
enemies"12 If Brazil has no enemies, why then would citizens vote for 
politicians who say they are going to use tax-generated funds for national 
security and defense when there are so many other demands in the 
socio-economic areas? 
A widely-held consensus among the elite and the general population 
affirms the country's peaceful vocation. As Luis Bitencourt and Alcides 
Costa Vaz state in the Executive Summary of their report on Brazilian 
Strategic Culture: 
Peace is thus the strategic and cultural norm; it involves active 
engagement by the State via alliances, diplomacy, economic 
developments, and trade partnerships. The Brazilian National Defense 
Strategy underscores and builds perceptions of security upon peace and 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts. It is remarkable that the first word 
in the Brazilian National Defense Strategy of 2008 is "peace." This key 
document states that "peace is the main goal of this strategy." In 
general, Brazilians believe that they are a peaceful people, and that 
. . . d I I I 13 peace IS an mgrame cu tura va ue. 
The view of peace as a vocation is supported by the public's general 
perception. As the 2013 Pew Global Attitudes Project stated: 
Brazilians also have an upbeat view of how their country is perceived 
abroad. Eight-in-ten believe that people in other countries around the 
world generally like Brazil, while only 18 percent say Brazil is generally 
disliked. Among the 22 counties included in the spring 2010 Pew 
Global Attitudes survey, Brazilians are among the most likely to think 
their country is well-regarded by others around the globe. 14 
In sum, Brazilian governments since the end of the military regime in 1985 
have held a very benign view of the world in which national goals are to 
be achieved through diplomacy I-and trade. A huge stigma remains attached 
to the SNI, and thus to intelligence in general, since the SNI was the core 
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organization doing what was considered "intelligence" during that earlier 
time. Given their relations with neighboring countries, Brazil's civilian 
politicians have minimal incentives to be concerned about national defense 
and security issues. 15 
INTELLIGENCE REFORMS 
Undoubtedly, the most critical and basic reform in the Brazilian intelligence 
system was the dissolution of the SNI in 1990 by President Fernando Collor 
de Mello. Unfortunately, though, even had he not been impeached in 1992, 
his ability to implement a new system to replace the one left over from the 
military regime would have been doubtful. At that time the SNI was still 
involved in "dirty tricks," the Congress was just beginning to assert its 
power, and the executive branch lacked a plan for intelligence reform. Not 
until 7 December 1999, some nine years after the abolition of the SNI, was 
law #9,883, creating ABIN passed by Congress. And, not until 13 
September 2002 did decree #4,376 implement SESBIN. The history of the 
random efforts to reform intelligence in the sense of creating its 
framework, between 1990 and late 1999, is complex and illustrative of the 
situation of political disarray and lack of attention to security and defense 
in Brazil at that time. 16 Following the arbitrariness and legalisms of 
Brazil's 21-year military regime, a huge emphasis is today placed on 
legality, and the legislature has played a central role in the creation of the 
current Brazilian intelligence system. The series of congressional initiatives 
is the result of several factors. First, the Executive, at least until after 1995, 
did not want to deal with security and defense. Its officials were more than 
preoccupied with the economy and foreign debt. Second, a group of leftist 
members of Congress felt very strongly about the need to consolidate 
Brazilian democracy, perhaps most particularly in the intelligence sector, 
given the uses to which the system called "intelligence" was put during the 
dictatorship. And third, Congress became very much aware of its exclusive 
powers in providing oversight (fiscalizar;tio) over the Executive. Un surprisingly, 
then, the intelligence system is based on a multitude of legal documents. 
These laws extend beyond ABIN to different components of the system. In 
addition to law #9,883 creating ABIN, and decree #4,376 decreeing SISBIN 
into existence, and thereby structuring the overall system, are the following 
laws: Decree Law #3,448 of 5 May 2000, creating a Subsystem of Public 
Security Intelligence; Decree Law #3,505 of 13 July 2000, instituting an 
Information Security Policy in the Federal Administration; Decree Law 
#3,695 of 21 December 2000, with further elaboration on Public Security 
Intelligence; and a policy directive from the Minister instituting the 
Defense Intelligence System in the Ministry of Defense. (See the Appendix 
for a more complete listing and explanation of different types of laws.) 
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In addition to establishing the overall and detailed legal framework for the 
system, the Congress attempted to deal with the issue of oversight. In my 
i~terviews in ~rasilia in 1999 and 2000, the issue of oversight was being 
dIscussed but httle progress was made establishing in the mechanisms. In 
November 2002, at the conference on "Intelligence in Brazil: Contributions 
for Sovereignty and Democracy," oversight was a very prominent issue. 17 
On 21 November 2000, the Congress had created the Joint Commission 
for External Control of Intelligence Activities (CCAI). However, as of this 
writing, the legal regulation of the CCAI has yet to be passed. A further 
question persists as to how effective this oversight committee can be since 
it still has only one staff member. 
This single staff person, Joanisval Brito Gonyalves, has called our attention to 
an extremely important oversight mechanism in Brazil over all sectors of 
government, including intelligence. As he stated, "[T]he main achievement 
of the Brazilian system is the external control apparatus, especially the roles 
of the Public Prosecutor, the Judiciary, and the Congress. The Public 
Prosecutor is probably the most important institution for the control (both 
oversight and review) of public administration in the Brazilian Democracy.,,18 
Indeed, the Public Prosecutor (Ministerio Publico, or Public Ministry) has 
received much attention in democratic Brazil as a mechanism to counter the 
well-known tradition of elite and government impunity. Albert Fishlow, 
a highly-respected foreign observer of Brazil, citing Fabio Kerche, notes that 
the Public Ministry plays an important role in Brazilian political life and: 
"is singular because it combines elements-autonomy, instruments of 
action, discretion and full array of attributes-that are not common in 
institutions with few characteristics of accountability." This structure 
has become an integral part of the institutions undergirding an 
evolving democracy.19 
The Public Ministry is extremely powerful and autonomous in defending the 
public interest. Everyone in public life in Brazil is aware of its immense 
powers; it can act as a deterrent to public abuse, including in the area of 
national security and defense. This institution is almost unique in the 
world, and must be taken into consideration when analyzing the autonomy 
and activities of any Brazilian public institution, including the armed 
forces and intelligence agencies. In more specific auditing terms, the nation 
als~ has both a Secretaria de Controle Interno da Presidencia da Republica, 
whIch oversees the budget in general of the Presidencia, and the Tribunal 
de Contas da Unitio (TCD), which specifically looks to ABIN. 
A Hybrid Intelligence System 
That Brazil's intelligence systenf is a hybrid comes as no surprise, given the 
length of time involved in its formulation and the varying agendas of those 
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involved. Interviews and published materials indicate that the models on 
which the system is based are a combination of the U.S. and Canadian 
systems, with an emphasis on the latter. Like the U.S., Brazil has, at least 
formally, a very comprehensive system composed of thirteen different 
organizations. But, like Canada, ABIN, at the center of the system, is 
heavily focused domestically, and performs only analysis. Coordination of 
the overall system is supposed to take place in the Institutional Security 
Cabinet in the Presidency.2o Through his role in creating the system and 
managing it for four years, the Minister-Chief, General Alberto Cardoso, 
was able to fuse intelligence from both civilian and military organizations. 
A PUBLIC CAMPAIGN TO PROMOTE THE LEGITIMACY OF 
INTELLIGENCE IN A DEMOCRACY 
From the mid-1990s to the present the emphasis has been on distancing the 
intelligence system from the stigma of the SNI and the dictatorship's other 
militarized intelligence organizations. Since Brazil faces no obvious 
external threats, the post-military executive, even if it had wanted to, never 
made an argument to preserve the old system. Again, importantly, the 
democratic transition came at the initiative of the military, over the 
opposition of that sector of the military present in the SNI and other 
intelligence organizations. In addition, while the focus has been on 
replacing the SNI-with ABIN as that replacement-the Federal Police 
and the intelligence services of the armed forces have always been present. 
The Federal Police, in particular, appear to be the preferred organization 
to fight organized crime and drug trafficking, and to counter terrorism. 
Consequently, the reforms have been met passively by most intelligence 
officers and others in the Executive, and with total apathy by the general 
public. For this reason, Deputy Aido Rebelo, of the PC do B, but a favorite 
of the PT, held a very high profile conference in Brasilia on 6-7 November 
2002, subtitled "Contributions for Sovereignty and Democracy," that 
received a tremendous amount of publicity. In late November 2005 and 
again in early December 2006, the ABIN itself hosted international seminars 
attended by some 500 people, with ample media coverage. The goal in all 
three cases was to publicize the importance of intelligence in a democracy. 
Judging from what has not been done, they have so far not been successful. 
CHALLENGES IN DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Democratic Control, Yes; But Concern with Effectiveness 
In terms of democratic consolidation, the reforms of the intelligence system 
have been highly successful. The current system is composed of several 
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different, and competing, intelligence organizations; it operates within 
a robust legal framework; a viable oversight structure functions in the Public 
Ministry; the aSI provides an institutional basis to which the ABIN must 
adhere; and education and training are controlled through concursos. 
In terms of real effectiveness, however, there is considerable concem.21 
Limitations on Effectiveness in Intelligence 
In my February 2011 meeting with Celso Amorim, who had been Foreign 
Minister during the entire administration of President Lula 2002-2010 , 
I asked about Honduran President Manuel Zelaya taking up residence in 
the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, after he was overthrown 
in a coup and sent abroad on 29 June 2009. Ambassador Amorim 
emphasized that ABIN had not provided any advance information on 
Zelaya's post-exile return to Tegucigalpa and moving into the Brazilian 
embassy. He also stated that ABIN, like its predecessor the SNI, focuses 
mainly on internal Brazilian issues. 22 Yet, ABIN is supposed to be the 
center organization of the Brazilian intelligence system, and its mandate is 
not exclusively domestic issues. Even in regard to the latter, according to 
Joanisval Brito Gon9alves, 
[I]n 2013 President Dilma Rousseff expressed her disappointment with 
the effectiveness of the intelIigence apparatus, particularly due to the 
absence of intelIigence about the demonstrations in many Brazilian 
cities in June and during the FIF A Confederations Cup. There were also 
severe critics on the preparedness of the Brazilian counterintelIigence 
concerning the cases of espionage of American agencies against Brazil 
leaked by Edward Snowden.23 
In earlier pUblications, based mainly upon my interviews in Brazil, I 
expressed optimism about an increase in ABIN's effectiveness. Much of 
that analysis was based on the expectation that Brazil's hosting the World 
Cup in Soccer in 2014 and the Summer Olympics in 2016 would provide 
political incentives for improved effectiveness. Having followed this issue 
for a decade and a half, however, and seen no real improvement, I must 
conclude that any improvement in the near future is unlikely.24 
At least six reasons, or factors, must be considered in dealing with the 
challenges of achieving effectiveness in Brazil's intelligence system. First, as 
noted earlier, no mention is made of the intelligence function in the 
extremely long and detailed Brazilian Constitution of 1988. To give a sense 
of that detail, Colegio Pedro II, located in Rio de Janeiro, is specifically 
guaranteed government support in Article 242, no. 2.15 While efforts have 
been made since at least 2011 to present and have passed a constitutional 
amendment to define and legitimate Brazil's intelligence function, none of 
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them has passed. One serious implication of the lack of legislative definition 
and legitimacy is the fact that ABIN's personnel have no legal protection for 
their activities, overt or covert. 
Second, according to the 1988 Constitution, Section XII of Article 5, "the 
secrecy of correspondence and of telegraphic data and telephone 
communications is inviolable, except, in the latter case, by court order, in 
the cases and in the manner prescribed by law for the purposes of criminal 
investigation or criminal procedural finding of facts." And, as further 
defined in law No. 9296 of 24 July 1996, ABIN cannot do intercepts. 
Therefore, ABIN has to rely on the Federal Police, which can do intercepts. 
This involvement has been the source of the main scandals involving ABIN 
during the past decade. These scandals tend to associate ABIN in the public 
mind with the bad old days of the SNI. 
Third, consistent with Brazilian government requirements in general, entry 
into ABIN is via public competition rather than selective recruitment, with 
the result that ABIN's employees are regulated by the same public service 
rules as all other public servants. Once enrolled in the public service, ABIN 
employees can sign up for other competitions and, if successful, move on to 
other, better paying, and more prestigious positions. This does little for the 
institution's stability and the competence of its analytical functions. 
Fourth, no specific provision in law is available to punish a person who 
releases or leaks classified information. Only the standard criminal laws 
which relate to theft apply. There being no specific laws regarding 
classified information, and since a normal court process would be 
unacceptable in the context of releasing secret information, I was informed 
that, in fact, no penalty is incurred for releasing classified information.26 
Fifth, minimal funding is allocated to ABIN. Its 2014 budget was 528 
million Reais, the equivalent of about $206 million. For a sense of scale, 
the budget for Colegio Pedro II was 469 million, the Federal University of 
Rio Grande do Norte was 1,187 million, and the Ministry of Sport was 
3,256 million.27 
Six, while ABIN has a Director General, the agency is not responsible 
directly to the President of the Republic but rather to the Institutional 
Security Cabinet of the Presidency. The Gabinete de Seguram;a Institucional 
(GSI), the former Military Household, is headed by the only active duty 
military officer in the expanded cabinet. Since 2011 the GSI has been 
headed by Army General Jose Elito Carvalho Siqueira. He was 
reappointed to the post by President Rousseff in January 2015. This 
institutional relationship means that ABIN is at least one step removed 
from the President, and relations between General Carvalho Siqueira and 
ABIN have been problematic since he first took office four years ago. 
Several serious elements impede effective intelligence in Brazil, even with 
ABIN supposedly at the center of the overall system. In terms of our 
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framework for civil-military relations, shortcomings exist in all three areas: (a) 
no strategy exists for intelligence; (b) the institutional relationship. t~ the 
President via the GSI is cumbersome and awkward; and (c) mInImal 
resources are committed to intelligence.28 In short, the lack of incentives in 
a country that perceives no enemies, combined with the stigma from the 
past, has outweighed any imagined need to improve intelligence effective?ess 
in a country that is proud to be a member of the BRICS consortIUm 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), is the fifth largest in terms of 
area and population, and has the world's seventh largest economy. 
A wide awareness of these problems prevails. Since 2002 I have been 
participating in seminars, conferences, and the like on intelligence reform 
in Brazil. A great deal of hype and promise of reform always exists, but so 
far nothing substantial has materialized. The two main Brazilian experts 
on intelligence reform in Brazil are Joanisval Brito Gonc;alves and Marco 
Cepik. In his most recent article Brito notes that 
the Brazilian society has no clear perception of intelligence. Brazilians do 
not know enough about the country's Ie and still see the secret services 
with prejudice (and, in some cases, with fear) .... Whilst the popul~tion's 
perception of intelligence is not good, the ~oliticians' con;tprehens~on of 
the role of intelligence is extremely bad: In the Executive and In the 
Legislative branches decision makers do not know the Ie well, do not 
give them sufficient attention (with consequences for the Ie budget), 
and in fact, tend to see the secret services more as a thr~at to 
democracy than as a sector of the Government created to adVise the 
decision makers and to protect the State and the Society.29 
Cepik highlights many of the institutional weaknesses of the intelligence 
sector and states the following: 
It is noteworthy that all intelligence crises in Brazil since 1999 have b~en 
related to the lack of jurisdictional clarity among SISBIN agencies 
regarding their missions, priorities, and degree of subordination to the 
ABIN's formal role as the central agency. Yet, intelligence reform has 
been a low-priority issue for the Brazilian political system since the 
30 transition to democracy was completed more than 20 years ago. 
SOME PROGRESS-BUT NOT ENOUGH 
Two fundamental questions remain once the issue of effectiveness is 
considered: Does Brazil in fact not have enemies, and can it thus rely on 
a weak, constrained, poorly structured, and underfunded ABIN for its 
intelligence requirements? Or, can- or should-it rely on some other 
organization, such as the Pollcia Federal with a 2014 bud?et of 4,926 
million Reais (vs. ABIN's 528 million), for its intelligence reqUIrements? 
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Brazil has developed an intelligence system that appears on paper to be 
comprehensive and robust. The intelligence agencies are now unquestionably 
under democratic civilian control, yet concerns about the system's 
effectiveness are ongoing since the central organizing agency, ABIN, remains 
weak and, due to the legal and institutional framework under which it must 
work, constantly wracked by scandals. Despite a decade of promises for 
improvement, the intelligence system seems no more effective today than 
it was a decade ago. 
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APPENDIX OF LAWS AND DECREES31 




Number Year Main Focus 













under request of the 
constitutional 
government to law 
and order in the 
internal realm 
( Continued) 
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Appendix Continued. 
Enact 
Type of law Number Year Main Focus 
Ordinary Law 7.170 1983 National Security 
Law 




Ordinary Law 8.159 1991 Archives 
National 
Policy 
Executive 4.553 2002 Information 
Decree security 







Ordinary Law 9.296 1996 Judicial 
authorization 
in advance to 
telephone 
interceptations 
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Comment 
Still in place/passed 
under military rule. 
Congress examines 
now a Bill (PL 
6.764/2002) dealing 
with crimes against 
the state and 
democracy 
SNI was the powerful 
intelligence and 








Some articles changed 
by Law 10.217/2001 
ABIN is not allowed 
to either ask for 
such an 
authorization or to 
engage in tapping 
operations 
( Continued) 
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Appendix Continued. 
Enact 
Type of law Number Year Main Focus Comment 
Ordinary Law 9.883 1999 To establish the Missions are defined in 
Brazilian fairly general terms 
Intelligence based upon a broad 
Agency definition of 
(ABIN) and intelligence and 




Complementary 97 1999 To establish the MD structure and 
Law Defense resources were 
Ministry (MD) detailed by Decree 
and the 4.735/2003 and 
General Policy Directive MD 
Defense Staff 1.037/2003 
(EMD) 
Executive 3.695 2000 To establish the SENASP /MJ as 
Decree Public Security coordinator; Decree 
Intelligence 3.348/2002 first 
Sub-System defined ABIN as 
(SISP) SISP central agency, 
but the Ministry of 
Justice regained the 
coordinator role for 
the SISP 
Executive 4.376 2002 To specify Define members of the 
Decree SISBIN's SISBIN and its 
organization Consulting Council; 
and complemented by 
membership decree 4.872/2003 
Policy Directive 295 2002 To establish the Strategic Intelligence 
Ministry of Defense Department (DIE) 
Defense Intelligence of the MoD as the 
( COil t illued) 
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Appendix Continued. 
Enact 
Type of law Number Year Main Focus Comment 
System central organ 
(SIND E) 
Ordinary Law 10.862 2004 ABIN's Special Defines the 
Career Plan Information Analyst 




ethos & ethics 
requirements 
National 08 2000 Joint CCAI has been 
Congress Commission established since 
Internal for the 2000; as for August 
Resolution Intelligence 2004, the Brazilian 
Activities Congress has not 
Control approved the 
(CCAI) Commission's 
internal rules 
Brazilian federal intelligence and related laws. 1 
(Legal and administrative examples of instruments utilized by the Brazilian Congress to 
regulate different aspects of the intelligence and security field. As one should expect, 
Constitutional articles are hard to change (requiring a majority of 3/5 in both houses of 
the Congress). Complementary Laws are supposed to further regulate and make more 
specific some Constitutional articles. This type of law in Brazil requires an absolute 
majority in both houses of the National Congress. Inside the Brazilian legal hierarchy, 
Ordinary Laws are just laws, they are situated below the Constitution and the 
Complementary Laws, and they require only a simple majority (half plus one of the 
Representatives attending the Congress session) to be passed and enacted. Executive decrees 
are situated even below in legal terms, they are not laws, but they set policies and rules to 
the government agencies, much like the Executive Orders in United States. Policy Directives 
are administrative measures issued by specific Ministers and Cabinet members to regulate 
the government agencies under their responsibility. Finally, there are Legislative decrees 
and Congressional internal resolutIOns dealing with specific problems of internal 
organization and policy. See www.interlegis.gov.br. 
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